The article examines the reception of Kantian conception of experience in Martin Heidegger’s book Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. The context of Immanuel Kant’s theory of experience forms the basis for collation of Kant’s and Heidegger’s philosophies. Epistemological and metaphysical components of Kantian conception of experience are extracted. Two main Kant’s theoretical distinctions are discussed: the difference between the sensual matter of experience and conceptual form of experience; and the difference between the thing-in-itself and appearance. The research is focused on Kantian understanding of experience or empirical cognition, which is a process of synthesis of sensuous data and concepts. Collation of Kant’s and Heidegger’s philosophies and evaluation of Heidegger’s interpretational position appeals to theoretical contexts of metaphysical nominalism and metaphysical realism. The basic conclusion states that Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s theory of experience is transfused by the premises of Heidegger’s fundamental Dasein ontology. These premises determine significant transformations of Kant’s philosophy and the omission of some aspects of Kant’s theory of experience.

Article in: Lithuanian

Article published: 2015-07-15