ETHICS AS SECOND PHILOSOPHY, OR THE TRACES OF THE PRE-ETHICAL IN HEIDEGGER'S *BEING AND TIME*

Saulius Geniušas

Department of Philosophy and Religion, James Madison University,
Cleveland Hall, MSC 8006, Harrisonburg, VA 22807, USA
E-mail: *geniussh@jmu.edu*

I argue that Heidegger's central phenomenological contribution to the ethical problematic consists in disclosing the ethical life of subjectivity as split between two extremes, and there is no resolution between them. I show that in Being and Time, one can discern two sharply contrasting tendencies, which I call the anti-ethical and the ante-ethical tendencies. Although Heidegger has provided at least two ways to dispel such an ethical incongruity, I maintain that neither of the proposed solutions is satisfactory; nor is a solution called for. It is rather promising to return to the phenomenological description of two conflicting ethical tendencies in Being and Time. Heidegger's early description entails a profound insight, viz., the insight that the ethical life of subjectivity is incontestably and inescapably torn between ethical regulations and moral motivations.

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In what follows, I would like to suggest that phenomenology's unique contribution to the ethical problematic consists in disclosing ethics as second philosophy. By this I mean that for phenomenology, the real challenge consists in exploring those experiential domains which, while not being ethical themselves, motivate the emergence of morality and ethics. Just as for phenomenology there is the problem of the origins of judgment and of the origins of knowledge, so similarly, phenomenology's distinctive contribution to ethics should lie in its ability to pose and pursue the question of the origins of ethics. It is paradoxical, yet also telling, that phenomenology abandons this distinctive task at the very moment it places ethical themes at the center and origin of its descriptive field, i.e., when it claims that ethics is first philosophy[1]. To once again raise the question of the origins of ethics is possible only if one acknowledges that ethics is second philosophy.

Here I will address one phenomenological inquiry into the pre-ethical. I will build my case on Heidegger's analysis of conscience in *Being*

1 The title of this essay draws a direct reference to a celebrated article by Emmanuel Levinas, "Ethics as First Philosophy." This phrase, with which Levinas's writings are commonly (and, arguably, incorrectly) associated, by now has become representative of a larger phenomenon than Levinas's own work and even larger than Levinasian scholarship. This phrase has become representative of the exponentially growing consensus that, at bottom, everything of philosophical significance must, in one way or another, be ethical. This overwhelming demand to constantly address ethical and, by extension, ethico-political implications of any philosophical view is not so much liberating as it is blinding, if only because it blocks access to the analysis of those dimensions of experience that refuse to be packaged into an ethical framework. It seems to me that one of the central contributions phenomenology could make to ethics consists in disclosing those dimensions of experience that remain concealed in this common view.

and Time. This choice might appear surprising: as far as the phenomenological approach to ethics is concerned, *Being and Time* is only a blueprint, i.e., it only hints at a phenomenological engagement in the origins of ethics, but does not disclose it in all the necessary detail. Yet the preliminary nature of Heidegger's analysis notwithstanding, his inquiry into the relation between fundamental ontology and ethics makes it patently clear that our understanding of subjectivity will remain constricted for as long as we do not inquire into those dimensions of experience that are *not yet* ethical.

But how should this "not yet" be understood? There is an obvious danger inscribed in these words: besides signifying a pre-ethical dimension that calls for something like an ethics, these words can just as well be understood as a polite expression that conceals what in principle is anti-ethical. As we will see, this ambiguity is deeply rooted in Heidegger's analysis. On the one hand, many passages from Heidegger would support the view that ethics is not ontological, or at least that it has nothing to do with fundamental ontology. In this regard, I will speak of an *anti-ethical* character of *Being and Time*. Yet on the other hand, Heidegger's reinterpretation of ethical problems as ontological discloses, or at least aims to disclose, what one could call "originary ethics," where this phrase intimates that ethics is second philosophy with its roots in fundamental ontology[2]. In this regard, I will speak of an *ante-ethical* problematic in *Being and Time* (2008).

[2] *For Heidegger's own qualification of fundamental ontology as originary ethics, see Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism." In the recent critical readings of Heidegger, there have been a few attempts to disclose what such an originary ethics would look like. See, for instance, Joanna Hodge,* ***Heidegger and Ethics****, 189–204. The essays by Jean-Luc Nancy, Francoise Dastur, Jean Greisch, and Miguel de Beistegui, published in* ***Heidegger and Practical Philosophy*** *(ed. by Francois Raffoul and David Pettigrew), are all worth careful attention. See also Frederick Olafson,* ***Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics: A Study of Mitsein****, 95–105. Donovan Miyasaki's "A Ground for Ethics in Heidegger's Being and Time" (JBSP 38(3): 261–279) is also worth noting.*

The first two sections that make up this essay will spell out the anti- and ante-ethical tendencies in the context of Heidegger's analysis of conscience in *Being and Time*. In the third section, I will briefly indicate two ways in which Heidegger himself has aimed to overcome this ethical incongruity. Yet I will also suggest that neither Heidegger's early nor his late resolution is satisfactory; I will, moreover, maintain that no resolution can be satisfactory. My concluding remarks will consist in calling back to the ethical incongruity between anti- and ante-ethics that we still find present in *Being and Time*. It is this incongruity, I will suggest, that constitutes the core value of Heidegger's phenomenological contribution to the ethical problematic.

Heidegger's Anti-Ethics

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger's polemical confrontation with ethics unfolds in the second chapter of Division II, a chapter dedicated to the problematic of conscience, guilt, and authenticity. One cannot ignore the plain fact that all three themes have a distinctively moral ring to them. Yet Heidegger makes it patently clear that a phenomenological interpretation of these phenomena comes at the price of cutting off the bond that ties these themes to morality. The liberation of these themes from their moral and ethical interpretations turns out to be a necessary condition for their phenomenological appropriation.

According to the common view, conscience and guilt have their basis in morality, religion, or law. It seems that we, humans, can be conscientious insofar as we are capable of experiencing guilt, and that our experience of guilt stems from law-breaking, be the law moral, religious, or civic. The law in question rules over inter-human relations by qualifying what is admissible and what is not admissible. It thus seems that conscience and guilt rely upon two conditions: our indebtedness to Others and our respect for the law. More precisely, the common-view

problematic of conscience and guilt unfolds in the context of *discursive speech* that makes us responsible to a *particular law* and that is meaningful in the intersubjective context that binds us to *fellow human beings*.

Being and Time challenges this common view. These three qualifications do not characterize conscience and guilt themselves; rather, they qualify their *inauthentic interpretation*. The common interpretation of guilt and conscience covers up their genuine phenomenality; the common view *reinterprets* and *misinterprets* guilt and conscience in such a way that their existential significance is not only *concealed* but also *reversed*. And yet, as is the case with each and every theme addressed in *Being and Time*, the inauthentic interpretation of phenomena in question nonetheless entails a few clues, which hold the promise of disclosing the concealed significance of phenomena under scrutiny. It is hard to overstate the ontological significance of the call of conscience: once freed from its widespread (mis)interpretations (be they psychological, biological, religious, or moral), the call will have the power to chart the course between inauthenticity and authenticity. Its ontological significance is thus indeed profound: it consists in the fact that the call of conscience can be heard in inauthenticity and that it announces the possibility of authentic existence.

The voice of conscience is indeed discursive and disclosive, yet the medium of its expression is not that of discursive speech. This should come as no surprise, given Heidegger's insistence that discursive speech itself is always already appropriated by what Heidegger calls *das Man*. Thus, if the voice of conscience calls Dasein from inauthenticity to authenticity, it must find an alternative medium of expression. The most viable candidate for such an alternative is silence itself. And thus Heidegger writes: "The call asserts nothing, gives no information about world-events, has nothing to tell" (BT, 273/318).

We commonly draw a distinction between silence and discourse. We say that discourse is meaningful, while silence is meaningless. Yet Heidegger resists such a rough-and-ready distinction. He considers discourse, as idle talk, to be meaningless, and he insists that silence inscribed in anxiety is meaningful. The phenomenological interpretation of conscience and guilt is meant to reveal that not only the silence of anxiety, but also the silence of the call of conscience is profoundly meaningful.

Thus if, when caught in the standard (mis) interpretation of conscience, I identify the call of conscience with the voice that informs me of a particular rule I am supposed to follow, I can rest assured that what I hear is *not* the voice of conscience, but the voice of *das Man*. Similarly, if I identify my relation with fellow human beings as the origin of the voice of conscience, then, again, I must recognize that what I hear is not the voice of conscience itself, but rather the voice of *das Man*. Herein lies the reason for the phenomenological rejection of all the moral and ethical frameworks that locate the origin of conscience, guilt, and authenticity in any kind of an established ethical framework. These frameworks only inform Dasein how *one* (*das Man*) must act. These frameworks thus misinterpret the ontological significance of the call of conscience. *The problematic of conscience discloses a more basic dimension of life than ethical life; it discloses a dimension of life that knows nothing about ethics, and that has nothing ethical about it*.

The voice of conscience is a significant clue that can lead us toward the recognition of this hidden dimension of life. Yet for this voice to be genuinely disclosive, its ethical connotations must be placed within brackets: the voice must be heard in the absence of any kind of law and even in the absence of inter-personal relations:

> Losing itself in the publicness and the idle talk of the "they," Dasein *fails to hear* [*überhört*] its own Self in listening to the they-self. If Dasein is to be able to get brought back from this lostness of failing to hear itself, and if this is to be done through itself, then it must first be able to find itself – to

> find itself as something which has failed to hear itself, and which fails to hear in that it *listens away* to the "they" (BT, 271/315-16).

As mentioned above, even though silence is the medium of the call of conscience, the call is nonetheless *discursive*: "calling is a mode of *discourse*" (BT, 269/314). But if so, then it must be possible to analyze the call in terms of those structures that belong to any kind of discourse. In each and every type of discourse, one can distinguish three structural features: (1) the speaker, (2) the listener, and (3) the message. Thus, in the case of the call, one should also be able to distinguish between (1) the one who calls, (2) the one who is called, and (3) the message inscribed in the call.

Who is it that calls in the call? "*In conscience Dasein calls itself*" (BT, 275/320). And who is it that is called in the call? "The call reaches the they-self" (BT, 272/317). And what about the message? "In the call of conscience, what is it that is talked about…? Manifestly Dasein itself" (BT, 272/317). By pointing his finger at Dasein, Heidegger answers all three questions. At first glance, such a maneuver appears not only highly paradoxical but also hardly credible. Does it not land us in a schizophrenic rant, in which the differences between the speaker, the listener, and what is said are so blurred that they merge into one another? Yet a closer look reveals that Heidegger's answer is unavoidable. We already know that the call of conscience takes place outside my relations to fellow human beings. For this reason, the three structural dimensions of the call must reflect Dasein's own self. Yet clearly, what is meant by Dasein is in each of the three cases different: "the call is from afar unto afar" (BT, 271/316). Thus first, Dasein that calls is the one who stands in the face of the possibility of complete impossibility of being: the call essentially comes from anxiety. Secondly, Dasein that is called is the one that is lost in *das Man*. And thirdly, the message that is silently inscribed in the call announces the *possibility of Dasein's authentic existence*.

But when the call of conscience gets to be dispelled of law breaking and having debts, what sense is one to make of guilt that remains inscribed in the call? Heidegger's answer is direct, and yet by far not transparent: "We define the formally existential idea of the 'Guilty!' as 'Being-the-basis for a Being which has been defined by a 'not" – that is to say, as '*Being-the-basis of a nullity*" (BT, 283/329).

Arguably, the nullity of which Heidegger speaks needs to be understood in two different ways, which can be qualified in terms of the *nullity of choice* and the *nullity of thrownness*. Insofar as my "Being is defined by a 'not'," the nullity of my Being is the nullity of thrownness. Insofar as I am "the basis of a nullity," my nullity is the *nullity of choice*. Thus on the one hand, each and every choice that Dasein makes carries with it the awareness of not having chosen other possibilities. By choosing, I inevitably give up what I could have chosen had I chosen not what I decided to choose. To project a particular possibility into the future simultaneously means to suppress a number of other possibilities. The nullity of choice is inscribed in the actualization of any possibility for the simple reason that the actualization of a possibility is at the same time the exclusion of numerous other possibilities. What is not, could have been; and what could have been, speaks to me and proclaims, "Guilty!" And thus, I am guilty in that I am the basis of a nullity.

On the other hand, as the one who is thrown, I recognize that I am not the sole author of my own being. That is, insofar as I do not own my own being, I am inauthentic, and insofar as I recognize my own being in its inauthenticity, I strive for self-ownership (*Eigentlichkeit*). Yet the project of self-ownership can never be actualized for the simple reason that I am thrown into existence, i.e., that I do not stand at the bottom of my own being. This is not just a matter of realizing that there has been a time (even though I am never able to experience it) at which my being had its own beginning. More fundamentally, to recognize that one does not

stand at the bottom of one's being is to come to terms with the existential fact that, for the most part, my own being has already been chosen – and chosen not by me. My own existence is thus never fully mine, and this is the second sense inscribed in the silent call of guilt.

Ontologically, I am thus inevitably guilty. I am guilty because I am finite, and in a twofold sense: (1) each of my choices signifies the suppression of many other choices; (2) before I am capable of "choosing to choose" (BT, 270/314), i.e., before I can "make up for not choosing" (BT, 268/313), my choices have already been made, not by me, yet for me.

With this realization, we are finally in the position to catch sight of those dimensions of life that continuously get to be suppressed and overlooked in ethics and morality. Before ethical considerations come to the fore, subjectivity's life consists in the *recognition of finitude* in the double sense outlined in the paragraph above. That is, in contrast to other beings, a human being is not only finite, but it also *understands* itself as finite. As Heidegger's analysis reveals, this implicit recognition of finitude, far from being followed by its open acknowledgment, is rather coupled with its explicit rejection. The dramatic nature of *Being and Time* consists precisely in a detailed description of how subjectivity flees the implicit recognition of its own finitude. Ethics and morality are two specific ways (and there are many!) in which subjectivity covers up its own finitude.

Before proceeding to the analysis of Heidegger's ante-ethics, I would like to emphasize one consequence that stems from the foregoing analysis. Since Heidegger's well-known destruction of the primacy of theory is not accompanied by a similarly detailed destruction of the primacy of praxis, one could, given the limits of philosophical concepts, conjecture that Heidegger's anti-theoretical stance amounts to the restoration of the primacy of praxis. The foregoing analysis shows that this is certainly not the case. Heidegger's destruction of the primacy of theory is just as uncompromising as his demolition of the primacy of praxis. What Heidegger says in the "Letter on Humanism" is well suited to characterize *Being and Time* as well: "thinking is neither theoretical nor practical. It comes to pass before this distinction" (LH, 236). The real and only primacy of which Heidegger speaks is the primacy of finitude. Thus in contrast to Levinas, I would like to suggest that the strength of phenomenology consists in disclosing ethics as second philosophy, i.e., in showing that our understanding of subjectivity remains imprecise and distorted for as long as we do not inquire into those dimensions of life that are not yet ethical.

There is something deeply unethical about the view that at bottom, everything must be ethical, just as there is something deeply disrespectful of the Other when it comes to the suggestion that everything derives from the Other. As I have already indicated in the introductory comments, phenomenology's most significant contribution to ethics lies in the disclosure of those dimensions of life that remain concealed for as long as the assumption of the primacy of ethics is not abandoned. There is nothing odd about the fact that a thinker like Levinas, so deeply versed in phenomenology, distanced himself from phenomenology as soon as he avowed the primacy of the ethical[3]. This state of affairs is symptomatic of the fact that the primacy of ethics is incompatible with phenomenology. Between the two one must choose.

Heidegger's Ante-Ethics

In his important commentary on *Being and Time*, Hubert Dreyfus insightfully remarks that

> The best way to understand Heidegger on death is to see that the relation of being-unto-death to the event of dying is like the relation of the existential call of "Guilty!"

[3] *As will becomes apparent in the subsequent sections of this essay, even in Heidegger's own thought, the avowal of the primacy of ethics goes hand in hand with the abandonment of phenomenology.*

> to ordinary moral guilt. Ordinary death is a perspicuous but misleading illustration of Dasein's essential structural nullity, viz., that Dasein can have neither a nature nor an identity, that it is the constant impossibility of *being* anything specific. What Heidegger is getting at when he speaks of Dasein's constant and certain possibility of having no possibilities is the formal truth that Dasein has no possibilities of its own and that it can never have any (Hubert Dreyfus 1991: 312).

Although there clearly are some illuminating correlations between the existential notion of death and the existential call of guilt, like all analogies, this one also has its limits. In the case of death, Heidegger draws a terminological distinction between the existential being-towards-death (*Sein-zum-Tode*) and biological demise (*Ableben*) (BT, 247/291). This distinction makes patently clear that the common treatment of death has nothing in common with its existential interpretation. Yet the situation in regard to guilt and conscience is different. In this context, no terminological distinctions between the existential and the ordinary concepts are to be found, and for good reason. *The existential interpretation of guilt and conscience does not only aim to reverse the ordinary approach; the existential interpretation also aims to be the new foundation of the moral concepts of guilt and conscience*. And thus, besides conceptualizing Heidegger' anti-ethics, one is also in full right to address his ante-ethics.

One needs, however, to admit that the ante-ethical strand in *Being and Time* is not as developed as the anti-ethical tendency. Yet Heidegger provides some helpful hints, which show that the goal of *Being and Time* is not merely that of offering a phenomenological alternative to a philosophical ethics but rather that of laying down the ontological foundation for ethics and morality. Consider, for instance, the following:

> This essential Being-guilty is, equiprimordially, the existential condition for the possibility of the 'morally' good and for that of the 'morally' evil – that is, for morality in general and for the possible forms which this may take factically. The primordial "Being-guilty" cannot be defined by morality, since morality already presupposes it for itself. (BT, 286/332)

Unfortunately, Heidegger does not proceed to the elaboration of this thesis. In what follows, I would like to briefly touch upon what I consider to be the central elements of the ante-ethical dimension of Heidegger's thought.

It seems to me that Heidegger's ante-ethical tendency is composed of two elements:

1) Morality and ethics are not possible without subjectivity's aptitude for responsibility, conscience, and guilt.
2) Responsibility, conscience, and guilt cannot be explained on the basis of morality or ethics.

That is, a moral rule or an ethical framework might have the power to inform me of what I am supposed to do, yet neither is capable of constituting responsibility and guilt that accompany my refusal to comply. The ethical frameworks tell me what I am supposed to do in order to be morally good, yet they do not tell me why I would strive to be good. Thus Heidegger reverses the traditional hierarchy, which asserts that guilt has its basis in morality. The truth is just the reverse: the experience of guilt is the origin of morality. Heidegger's great ethical insight consists in the realization that subjectivity's ethical motivation is, at bottom, ontological. Following Michael Gelven, one could formulate this insight in the form of a dilemma:

> Is it that I first find out or learn what I ought to do, and then feel guilty if I violate that maxim or commandment; or is it that I first feel a call to be good or authentic, and then establish an ethical or moral order to satisfy this desire? If the second is the case, then guilt (conscience) is the foundation of ethics; if the first is the case, then ethics is the foundation of guilt (Gelven 1970: 64–65).

Thus, even though ethics is not part of fundamental ontology, it nonetheless stems from fundamental ontology. It is here, I would like to suggest, that Heidegger's most significant phenomenological contribution to the ethical problematic is to be found. On the basis of this insight, the earlier claim regarding the secondariness of ethics can be further developed. It now becomes plain that the secondariness of ethics is not to be understood in terms of its insignificance. For phenomenology, the ethical problematic consists in the disclosure of those motivating factors that lead to something like an ethics. For Heidegger, these motivating factors are ontological.

Heidegger's Two Solutions to Ethical Incongruity

Being and Time only hints at the ante-ethical strand and does not develop it. What is even more distressing, after the publication of *Being and Time*, this strand is no longer to be found in Heidegger's writings. A detailed inquiry into the reasons that underlie such a dismissal would take me too far afield. Suffice it to observe that a careful development of the ante-ethical tendency would require Heidegger either to severely modify, or even to abandon, the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity. Not being willing to do either, Heidegger is forced to look for alternative ways to deal with the ethical incongruity that we find present in *Being and Time*.

Heidegger has considered too possible solutions to the problem of ethical incongruity. The first solution can be found in his lecture course, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, which Heidegger delivered a little more than a year after the publication of *Being and Time*. In these lectures, particularly in the section "Freedom and World," Heidegger's analysis leads to the conclusion that the relation between fundamental ontology and ethics is no greater than that between fundamental ontology and sociology, politics, or biology. The latter are exclusively absorbed in beings; they know nothing of ontological difference. Thus the first solution consists in a straightforward abandonment of the ante-ethical tendency: fundamental ontology is anti-ethical, not ante-ethical.

Heidegger's second solution is, in a sense, the reverse of the first one. In his "Letter on Humanism," Heidegger likens his own thought to that of the pre-Socratic thinkers who "knew neither a 'logic,' nor an 'ethics" (LH, 231), yet whose thought was more logical and more ethical than subsequent thinking was ever to attain. Supposedly, the readers of Heidegger's work should not be taken aback by the absence of what they are accustomed to call "ethics," since "that thinking which thinks the truth of Being as the primordial element of man, as one who eksists, is in itself the originary ethics" (LH, 235). This would mean that the question regarding the relation between fundamental ontology and ethics is meaningless: Heidegger's ontology is neither ante-ethical, nor anti-ethical; it is rather originary ethics itself.

This is not the place to provide a detailed response to both solutions. Suffice it to indicate that neither of the claims resolves the conflict between two tendencies that we find present in *Being and Time*, but only suppresses the problem by masking it. Heidegger's claim that fundamental ontology is nothing more than anti-ethics is just as unacceptable as his claim that it is originary ethics. Both solutions offer only empty labels that cover up the real tension between two tendencies without rendering them congruent.

Concluding Remarks

Is fundamental ontology anti-ethical or ante-ethical? As we have seen, in *Being and Time*, as opposed to Heidegger's later works, this question never gets foreclosed. This back and forth movement between anti- and ante-ethics is significant because it clears the ground on which

one becomes free to engage in a fundamental question, which in many ethical frameworks remains only peripheral: *What is it about human existence that calls for something like an ethics?*

From what has been stated above, it should be clear that Heidegger provides us with more than one answer to this question. On the one hand, there is the dominant tendency to identify Dasein's fallenness into inauthenticity as the origin of all the rules and regulations that constitute the diversity of ethical systems. On the other hand, we also encounter the more suppressed tendency to identify the problematic of guilt and conscience as the genuine source of ethics. There is thus a conflict between ethical normativity, whose origins lie in inauthenticity, and ethical motivation, which has its source in authenticity. To return to the question of ethics in *Being and Time* is to once again ask: Is it at all possible to reconcile the tension between these two origins of morality without illegitimately sacrificing one of them? The previous section has suggested that Heidegger's own solutions to this question are unsatisfactory.

We are thereby left with two possibilities. A more optimistic path would lead to a patient and detailed modification of the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity. Such a modification would provide, so one might hope, the basis for the claim that ultimately, as Heidegger himself remarks in *Being and Time*, conscience and guilt constitute the source of morality and ethics. A more realistic path, however, would lead to the realization that morality does not have only one origin, i.e., that *for us humans, to be moral is to be torn between authentic motivations and inescapably inauthentic regulations*. This, I would like to suggest, is the philosophical import that lies hidden in the conflict between the anti- and ante-ethical strands of *Being and Time*. The irreconcilable conflict between these two tendencies indicates that *moral regulations and moral motivations have different origins of sense: while moral motivations are grounded in guilt and conscience, moral regulations are grounded in the rules of das Man*. This means that one can be moral only as a split subjectivity. The phenomenological significance of the question of ethics in *Being and Time* consists precisely in the disclosure of this existential and ontological conflict that qualifies the moral dimension of human existence.

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ETIKA KAIP ANTROJI FILOSOFIJA, ARBA IKI-ETINĖS FILOSOFIJOS UŽUOMAZGOS HEIDEGGERIO VEIKALE *BŪTIS IR LAIKAS*

Saulius Geniušas

Straipsnyje pabrėžiama, jog pagrindinis Heideggerio įnašas į etinę problematiką glūdi fenomenologiniame aprašyme. Jame atskleidžiama, kad etinis subjekto gyvenimas yra suskilęs į dvi nesutaikomas priešybes. Straipsnyje parodoma, jog Heideggerio „Būtyje ir laike" galima atskirti dvi kontrastuojančias tendencijas – anti-etinę (anti-ethical) ir iki-etinę (ante-ethical) tendencijas. Nors Heideggeris pateikia bent du būdus, kaip tokį etinį konfliktą galima būtų išspręsti, straipsnyje tvirtinama, jog nė vienas iš Heideggerio siūlomų sprendimų nėra patenkinamas. Tiesą sakant, jokio sprendimo nė nereikia ieškoti. Būtų svarbu sugrįžti prie fenomenologinio dviejų konfliktinių tendencijų aprašymo „Būtyje ir laike". Heideggerio aprašyme glūdi nuodugni įžvalga, jog etinis subjekto gyvenimas esąs nenuginčijamai ir neišvengiamai suskaidytas į moralinių motyvacijų ir etines taisykles.

Reikšminiai žodžiai: etika, fenomenologija, fundamentalioji ontologija, kaltė, sąžinės šauksmas.

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