

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND OTHERNESS: HEGEL AND HUSSERL

Saulius Geniušas

218 Sheldon Hall, James Madison University, Department of Philosophy and Religion,
MSC 7504 James Madison University, Harrisonburg, VA 22807

Countless differences between Hegel and Husserl notwithstanding, there is a common element in both of their accounts of the genesis of otherness. According to both, only if one delves into the interiority of self-consciousness, can one account for the rudimentary appearance of the Other. Following the Hegelian and Husserlian variants of such a strategy, this paper argues that: (1) at the primitive levels of self-consciousness, subjectivity is intersubjective through and through; (2) an irreducible distance separates the Other from the self, due to which plurality cannot be surpassed by totality. In contrast to the view which sees these claims as though they were irreconcilable with each other, this paper shows how each of them calls for its apparent opposite. While it is common to establish the unanimity of these claims in opposition to Hegel, or Husserl, or both, this paper shows how such a concordance itself emerges from an Auseinandersetzung between them.

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Introduction

The following inquiry aims to establish two seemingly irreconcilable claims. The first is of Hegelian origin: there is a need to admit that at the most rudimentary levels of self-consciousness, subjectivity is intersubjective through and through. The second claim, despite the resistance on Hegel's side, follows Husserl's lead: one needs to recognize the irreducible distance that separates the Other from the self and thus the impossibility to surpass plurality towards totality. Not only are these claims fully compatible with each other; more importantly, they place a significant demand on subsequent phenomenologies of intersubjectivity.

While a number of post-Husserlian phenomenologists agree with these claims full-heartedly, they routinely establish them on the basis of a critique directed against Husserl, or Hegel, or both. My task is that of demon-

strating how these claims emerge from the *Auseinandersetzung* between Hegel and Husserl. Only so can one see how Hegel and Husserl, despite the numerous differences between them, could have been the figures that remain unparalleled in terms of the influence exerted on the subsequent Continental tradition.

1.

Both for Hegel and Husserl the emergence of the Other takes on a paradoxical form: One needs to delve into the interiority of self-consciousness so as to account for the most rudimentary appearance of the Other. Yet for Hegel this means something altogether different than it does for Husserl. While in the latter's account of intersubjectivity in the Fifth Meditation, a

phenomenologically secured sphere of Ownness provides the ground for the constitution of the Other, for Hegel a phenomenological return to self-consciousness culminates in the recognition that self-consciousness itself is possible only in the midst of other self-consciousnesses. Let me start with the Husserlian position.

If one were to measure texts in terms of the intensity of criticisms they receive, one would have to admit that the Fifth Cartesian Meditation has no parallels in the whole corpus of Husserl's works. This text has been denounced by distant philosophical traditions as well as by Husserl's students; Husserl repeatedly criticized it himself, seeing its chief limitation in that it was limited to the methodological guidelines of static phenomenology¹. The profundity and severity of these criticisms remains so devastating that an attempt to uncover what is still phenomenologically significant in this Meditation faces almost insurmountable difficulties. While it may not be too hard to point out its shortcomings, it is a true challenge to gain the necessary distance from the multifaceted critiques so as to extract what remains significant within it.

Having presented phenomenology as transcendental idealism at the end of the Fourth Meditation, Husserl turns in the beginning of the Fifth one to what *might* appear as a grave objection – the charge of solipsism. The emergence of this charge gives rise to the impression that Husserl here will deal with the same set of problems and thus run into the same dead-ends as Descartes has in his *Meditations*. Yet a closer look reveals that this is not the case at all: (1) When Husserl raises this charge, he is well aware that his previous *Meditations* have already answered it. This is so, because the solipsistic charge is made from the standpoint of the *natural attitude* which underwent sus-

pension already in the First Meditation. (2) Yet phenomenology itself does not emerge in a historical vacuum and it therefore faces the problems that the philosophical community has inherited from the philosophical tradition. Each and every turn to the subjective meets the charge of solipsism and phenomenology has no right to assume immunity from it.

Hence the problem: How can phenomenology address a charge which it has already answered? How is one to experience the full weight of the problem of solipsism when the *natural* ground has been removed from under subjectivity's feet? The charge of solipsism needs to be thoroughly transformed so as to constitute a genuine problem for phenomenology. For this purpose Husserl in §44 institutes a return to the question of the reduction and introduces its new variant, "the reduction of transcendental experience to the sphere of ownness."

Here we encounter Husserl's paradoxical demand to turn to the deepest levels of the interiority of consciousness so as to clarify the rudimentary manifestation of otherness. This paradoxical demand appears to be unavoidable: if phenomenology's task is that of clarifying the sense of otherness, the being of the Other can no longer be taken at its face value. The robustness of the paradox in question indicates the success of phenomenology: the success of the phenomenological account of the emergence of the Other goes hand-in-hand with the patency of this paradox.

However, the phenomenological requirement to delve into the interiority of consciousness by way of suspending the constitutive effects of intersubjective intentionality proves to be dangerously ambiguous. "If I 'abstract' (in the usual sense) from others, I 'alone' remain. But such abstraction is not radical; such aloneness in no respect alters the natural world-sense, 'experienceable by everyone,' which attaches to the naturally understood Ego and would not be lost, even if a universal plague had left only me" (CM 1960: 95). The ego that the reduction leaves unaffected is not I, this person, but rather

¹ "Here it is not a matter of uncovering a genesis going on in time, but a matter of 'static analysis' (CM 1960: 108). See Ludwig Landgrebe's "Phenomenology as Transcendental Theory of History," in Husserl. 1977. *Expositions and Appraisals*. Ed. by F. Elliston and P. McCormick. Indiana: Notre Dame, 101–114.

the *transcendental* ego. Likewise, the question of the emergence of the Other is the question of the emergence of another *transcendental* ego within my own *transcendental* space, emerging as *precisely something other*.

Abstracting from all that is not peculiarly my own, one still retains “a unitarily coherent stratum of the phenomenon world” (CM 1960: 99). Husserl designates this stratum as the *founding* one. It is nothing less than “Nature” included in my ownness, within which my *body* occupies a unique position. My body is uniquely singled out because, besides being a body (*Körper*), it is also an *animate organism*, or *flesh* (*Leib*), to which I ascribe *fields of sensation* and which manifests a reflexive self-relation. Here we are on the verge of Husserl’s essentially anti-Cartesian answer to the solipsistic charge: phenomenology can account for the constitution of an alter ego due to the fact that the transcendental ego has a *body*.

Reducing others to my sphere of ownness, I see them as *bodies* (*Körper*) that manifest a surprising similarity to my own. This means that I constitute myself as a *human* Ego, as a member of the “world” within a multiplicity of other bodies. Yet I am simultaneously aware that it is I, the transcendental ego, who constitutes this multiplicity. The “paradox of subjectivity” lies at the bottom of Husserl’s notions of “analogical apperception” and “pairing.” Yet before addressing these themes directly, a few remarks need to be made concerning the different senses of *transcendence* operative in these Husserlian meditations.

In §47 Husserl shows that the intentional object belongs to the full concretion of the sphere of ownness. This means that transcendence does not lie outside the domain of transcendental immanence, but rather plays a role within it. Yet what kind of transcendence is in question here? If the term is not stripped of its equivocations, one would have to conclude at this point that the Other is not genuinely transcendent to the transcendental I, i.e. that he or she is not truly the Other. Hence the

necessity to distinguish between “primordial” transcendence, made up of that “Nature” from which the transcendental ego is inseparable, and the *secondary Objective transcendence*. Since the Other is not to be found in “immanent transcendence”, Husserl writes: “*not all my own modes of consciousness are modes of my self-consciousness*” (CM 1960: 107). The question of the Other lies at the frontier between the sphere of ownness and genuine transcendence: The alter ego is the first form of that transcendence which is *excluded* from my own concrete “primordial” ego. Or as Husserl himself has it, “*the intrinsically first other* (the first ‘non-Ego’) *is the other Ego*” (CM 1960: 109).

What happens when the Other intrudes upon the field of my vision? If I remain within the sphere of my ownness, I speak of the Other in terms of “immanent transcendence.” I account for this givenness by saying: the Other is herself there before me in person. Yet I am also aware that what belongs to the Other’s essence is precisely what falls outside my own and is thus not experienced by me directly. I must therefore speak of the Other the way I speak of myself, viz., as both *Leib* and *Körper*. I must speak of the Other through *mediated* intentionality which goes out from the “primordial world and makes present to consciousness a ‘there too,’ which nevertheless is not itself there and can never become an ‘itself-there.’” (CM 1960: 112). Here lies the ground of Husserl’s contention that secondary transcendence emerges *only on the ground of primordial transcendence*, for the Other acquires the sense of an alter ego by means of an *apperceptive transfer of sense*. With this, the key move of the Fifth Meditation has been reached: we have delimited the sphere of ownness *which in its very difference from the Other makes the Other possible*.

While objects manifest themselves in virtue of what Husserl terms the passive synthesis of *identification*, the Other makes her appearance due to the passive synthesis of *association*, whose primal form is *Paarung*. The distinctive feature of the latter type of passive synthesis is that two

data are given to intuition (i.e. myself and the Other) and found a unity of similarity. Thus they are always constituted as a pair. On the basis of this similarity, given in pure passivity, a transfer of sense takes place. When the Other enters my perceptual field, her body is experienced as “similar” to mine and it thus enters into a *Paarung* with mine, thereby appropriating the sense of an animate organism.

For Husserl, the analysis of self-objectification is inseparable from the inquiry into the potentialities that pertain to my primordial sphere. The Other is appresentatively constituted in mine as a “modification” of my own ego, which first must itself be objectivated. The very fact that the ego as an animate organism is capable of transforming any “there” into a “here” gives rise to my apperception of the other ego as having similar modes of spatial appearance that I would have “if I should go over there and be where he is” (CM 1960: 120). In this manner, the sphere of my ownness *motivates* the appearance of the Other as an alter ego. With this, Husserl contends, the phenomenological approach has made it clear how the constitution of the Other takes place.

2.

Let me single out three difficulties that the account of the constitution of the Other in the Fifth Meditation faces:

(1) It is surprising that in this phenomenology of the Other, *communication*, or more generally, genuine *interaction* plays no constitutive role. The most primitive encounter of the Other takes place in radical *silence*. If within this carefully secured methodological space my seeing of the Other “over there,” as if I myself where there, constitutes the basis of intersubjectivity, then the Other is appresented as another *transcendental monologue*. Let us therefore ask together with A. Steinbock: “Is the monological ‘solitary life of the soul’ still a transcendental phenomenological possibility for a philosophy that has purportedly

opened up an intersubjective sphere of experience?” (Steinbock 1995: 74).

(2) Is there a phenomenological necessity that governs the appearance of the Other as the appearance of another transcendental *individual* on the basis of the already constituted selfhood? Does the characterization of intersubjectivity in terms of, and parallel to, the multiplicity of human subjectivities, i.e. individuals, not contradict the very message of the phenomenological reduction, which calls for the abandonment of tacit presuppositions, which one would wish to transfer from the natural attitude to the proper phenomenological domain? One finds Eugene Fink raising these questions in the *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*; one also finds Husserl himself preoccupied with these questions in his analyses of primordial temporality and the metaphysics of individuation. Could it be so that, at the level of its rudimentary manifestation, the Other pierces through my very ownness and even makes the latter possible?

(3) Have the most significant consequences of the decisive distinction between *Körper* and *Leib* been accounted for in this *Meditation*? There are good reasons to suggest that my own animate organism cannot serve as the first *analogon* for the analogical transfer of sense if it is not already experienced as a body among bodies. As Paul Ricoeur has argued, “Making into a world consists in an authentic intertwining by which I perceive myself as a thing in the world. Given this, has the die not ‘already been cast’ (Ricoeur 1992: 333)? In order to speak of my own animate organism as a body among bodies presupposes that I myself am an Other among Others. Only an animate organism which already is a body for others can justify the notion of the *analogical transferring*. But if so, then the sense of otherness must be more rudimentary than the Fifth Meditation contends. With these questions in mind, let me turn to Hegel’s position.

3.

The question how consciousness becomes self-consciousness dominates the first section of Hegel's *Phenomenology*. At its initial stage, this transition is the movement which removes the difference between consciousness and its object by rendering the identity between them explicit. This movement is accomplished with the realization that the initial supposition, according to which the appearing object is an object in itself, is a pretense of the naively objective stance. The truth of the object is in fact a truth for another. Holding on to this realization, consciousness makes a distinction between itself and its object while being aware that this distinction is not actual. The transition to self-consciousness amounts to the realization that the object's being-in-itself is its being-for-another.

This is an unprecedented achievement. In the realm of consciousness, truth, estranged from itself, resided in a foreign land. After making the transition into self-consciousness, it "returns" to its native land and soil: "With self-consciousness we have entered the native realm of truth" (PhS 1977: 104). Or as Heidegger has it, "one can speak of truth only when certainty is no longer merely the certainty of the sensible, but when it turns back onto itself and thereby becomes the certainty of itself" (Heidegger 1980: 129).

Yet does self-consciousness, as the motionless tautology "I am I," not equal the impossibility of self-consciousness? Self-consciousness is possible only if interpreted as "internal unrest." Only in this way can it both distinguish itself from its object and announce its own identity with it. Yet if self-consciousness is conceivable only as motion, then the distance which separates the object from consciousness needs to be simultaneously overcome *and* preserved. This simultaneous opposition to and overarching of the Other is possible only if self-consciousness both identifies itself with consciousness and recognizes the emptiness of consciousness' certainty. We thereby witness the emergence

of two moments of self-consciousness: (1) Self-consciousness preserves the moments of consciousness, although in a transformed way: The sensuous world is its first object, although preserved as mere *appearance*. (2) Self-consciousness realizes that this difference is no difference and thus faces a second object, viz. itself. Due to the differentiation of its moments, consciousness obtains a dynamism without which it could never be self-conscious. Can we identify a form of self-consciousness that would possess such a structure? Hegel's answer points in the direction of *desire*.

Why *desire*? Hegel's analysis of consciousness culminates in the realization that the supersensible world is the world of self-consciousness. One tests this hypothesis by way of turning to the most rudimentary levels of self-consciousness so as to show how the primitive forms of self-relation underlie and determine our conceptions of objectivity. Thus we turn to desire – a mere *sentiment* of the self. The implications of such a turn are far-reaching: If we are to encounter the Other at this primitive level, then the manifestation of the Other is more rudimentary than the Husserlian constitutive levels admit. As Kojève has argued, "the analysis of 'thought,' 'reason,' 'understanding,' and so on – in general, of the cognitive, contemplative, passive behavior of a being or a 'knowing subject' – never reveals the why or the how of the birth of the word 'I,' and consequently of self-consciousness" (Kojève 1969: 3). The analysis of these terms cannot reveal the origin of "the Other" either.

Although at the initial stage desire appears as the destruction of all otherness, precisely as far as this destruction is complete and immediate, one cannot *sensu stricto* speak of desire as a form of self-consciousness. To use Gadamer's apt example, it is not by coincidence that we speak of being hungry as a bear or a wolf. When hunger predominates to the extent that nothing fills one besides the single dimension of the instinctual drive, one does not possess self-consciousness. Even though the condition of animal

desire consists in knowing nothing other than oneself, the satisfaction of desire cancels itself and simultaneously cancels self-consciousness. Thus "in order that desire might attain true self-consciousness, the object of desire must, in all of its 'nothingness of the other,' still not cease to exist. It must be living self-consciousness in the 'particularity of its distinctness'" (Gadamer 1976: 61).

This realization inverts the initial truth that desire holds. Now one sees that if desire is to be a form of self-consciousness, it can be such only if its object does not cease to exist. The object of desire must be reproduced again and again if desire is to be self-conscious. Desire is dependent upon those very objects whose destruction constitutes its being and truth.

For Husserl the sense of *existence* is the motivating force which calls for the transcendental clarification of otherness. For Hegel the notion of *life* plays a similar role in the development of self-consciousness. It manifests a similar dialectic to the one encountered in desire. Life undergoes a threefold modification. (1) It is an immediate unity which supersedes all distinctions, or an absolutely restless infinity into which all movement is resolved. At this level, the shapes of life have no enduring existence. (2) This infinite life splits into independent shapes. Its shapes appear determinate: they do not dissolve into the universal element but preserve themselves in themselves. As a passive separation of shapes, life, having divorced itself from its inorganic nature, becomes a *process*. This second level is an inversion of the first one: While earlier the shapes of life counted as inessential and were dissolved into the infinite, now the universal medium proves to be inessential and life appears to be a *living thing*. (3) In the independent shapes, life preserves itself only as the fluidity of differences and as their dissolution. Life splits into a multiplicity of new shapes, continuously forming new members and dissolving them in its own unity. The *immediate* continuity with which the analysis of Life began loses its immediate character and becomes a

process which dissolves its development and in this very movement preserves itself. We thereby reach Life as a reflected unity which proves to be a genus, and as such it points to consciousness to which this unity itself appears.

Hegel calls self-consciousness "this other Life." One needs to take this expression in its full force. It means that self-consciousness itself manifests the same structure that we have witnessed in the dialectic of Life. Yet there is an important difference: this "other Life" is *conscious*, it is that Life for which life itself appears as a genus. (1) Just as life in its initial form appears to be an immediate unity which dissolves all distinctions, so self-consciousness too appears as the pure undifferentiated "I" by means of dissolving all otherness. (2) Yet just as in the second determination of life we witnessed an inversion, so self-consciousness also calls for a similar deepening of its own certainty. The very fact that desire feeds on the destruction of the Other means that self-consciousness is *dependent* upon otherness. The Other thereby makes the first appearance as Life which lies concealed behind annihilation.

How can self-consciousness remain certain of being for itself while recognizing that this certainty relies on the "supersession of the Other"? Two conditions that need to be met: the object of desire must be independent and it must itself effect negation within itself. Only a living being that is conscious of itself, only self-consciousness, can meet these two conditions. (3) Thus just as life, having lost its universal character, regains it through the mediacy of its own differentiation, so self-consciousness too, having lost its certainty of itself, regains it through the mediacy of another self-consciousness. Even though self-consciousness' certainty of itself is annulled by the recognition of its dependence upon the object of desire, it is regained by the discovery that its truth relies upon the confirmation I receive from another self-consciousness. The realization that the very *existence* of self-consciousness is dependent upon another

self-consciousness constitutes the necessity for the dialectic of desire to lead to the dialectic of *recognition*. If self-consciousness is to be free, its freedom must be found upon its more rudimentary dependence upon others. *Genuine freedom can only be universal.*

Self-consciousness can exist only in the midst of other self-consciousnesses, for “only so it is in fact self-consciousness; for only in this way does the unity of itself in its otherness become explicit for it” (PhS 1977: 110). As Hegel sees it, from now on *no analysis of self-consciousness can be unfolded in egological terms*. Even the journey we have taken so far needs to be re-evaluated in the face of the realization that self-consciousness is intersubjective through and through. Thus even though the movement of self-consciousness has been represented in terms of one self-consciousness, “this action of the one has itself the double significance of being both its own action and the action of the other” (PhS 1977: 111–112). This doubling of self-consciousness is inevitable, for only by means of others can self-consciousness acquire affirmation of its own certainty: “Action by one side only would be useless” (PhS 1977: 112). Thus the being-for-itself of self-consciousness is possible only as the being-for-self of the Other.

Having discovered its dependence upon the Other, self-consciousness abandons its initial hypothesis which doomed the Other inessential. “Each is for the other the middle term, through which each mediates itself with itself and unites with itself; and each is for itself, and for the other, an immediate being on its own account, which at the same time is such only through this mediation. They *recognize* themselves as *mutually recognizing* each other” (PhS 1977: 112). This is, to use Robert Williams’ expression, the “syllogism of recognition”, in which each term is both extreme and mean². While serving as a mediator for another and while receiving mediation from the Other, self-consciousness

is truly self-conscious. The stage is thereby set for the dialectic of Lordship and Bondage which follows Hegel’s portrayal of the manifestation of the Other at the very heart of self-consciousness’ being.

4.

A Hegelian critique of Husserl’s account of otherness consists in showing that the Fifth Meditation fails to provide a full account of the *Sein* of *Selbst-Bewußtsein*. Husserl provides a rich description of the different ways consciousness intends different types of objectivities, yet for this very reason the most rudimentary manifestation of the Other escapes him. *Objectifying the Other already presupposes a more originary encounter of otherness at the very heart of the existence of self-consciousness.*

In Husserl otherness intrudes upon the sphere of ownness as an *appearance* which escapes the confines of my “primordial Nature”. It is a phenomenon which cannot be reduced to “primary transcendence”. It is the inevitable failure to turn all forms of consciousness into self-consciousness that opens the space for the appearance of the Other. Thus the Other appears as a unique *phenomenon*. Here we encounter Hegel’s resistance: Before I direct my gaze upon the Other, the Other reveals himself to me in a pre-phenomenal mode. My being is such that it is inseparable from the existence of Others. This calls for a reassessment of the pre-social and pre-interactive aspects of the sphere of ownness. Can this Hegelian insight be translated into Husserlian terms, or are we facing two incompatible accounts of the genesis of intersubjectivity?

In Ricoeur’s inquiry into the consequences of the relation between *Leib* and *Körper* we encounter a compelling presentation of the tension which separates the intersubjective character of the self from the Husserlian problematic of the ego³. Ricoeur dissociates “Husserl’s great

² Williams, R. 1997. *Hegel’s Ethics of Recognition*. University of California Press.

³ See the Tenth Study of *Oneself as Another*.

discovery” of the distinction between flesh and body from the strategic role it plays in the *Meditations*. According to Ricoeur, the Fifth Meditation manifests a threefold dependence of the ego upon the Other, despite Husserl arguing to the contrary.

(1) There is a tenor of meaning which precedes the reduction to ownness: I have always known that the Other is not an object but a subject of thought and of perception, a co-subject of the constitution of the world as a common nature. (2) There is a concealed presupposition of the Other in the formation of the sphere of ownness. The hypothesis that I am alone could never have been totalized without the help of the Other. Thus what Husserl terms “primordial world” would lack comprehensibility without presupposing the constitution of the common Nature. (3) My body as an animate organism can be the basis of the “analogical transference of sense” only if it is already understood as a body among bodies⁴.

Does this mean that the most primordial manifestation of the Other escapes the Husserlian domain? So as to engage in this question, I turn to another French phenomenologist, whose works articulate the inseparability of the Hegelian intuition concerning the intersubjective character of self-consciousness from the Husserlian notion of the flesh.

According to Sartre, the fundamental failure of the customary analyses of the Other consists in the tendency to treat object-ness as the primary relation between the Other and myself. Object-ness is only one of the modalities of the Other’s presence; it does not as such constitute the fundamental relation between the Other and myself. Such is the case not only because considering this modality as fundamental amounts to admitting that the Other’s existence is destined forever to remain conjectural. More importantly, although it justifies the appearance of the Other-as-object, the manifestation of the Other-as-subject escapes it. Within this framework, nothing “enables us to leave the level on

which the Other is an *object*. At most we are dealing with a particular type of objectivity akin to that which Husserl designates by the term *absence* (Sartre 1956: 344).

Yet the phenomenon of “being-seen-by-an-other” is an irreducible fact which cannot be deduced from the essence of the Other-as-object. This phenomenon is the fundamental relation between the Other and myself. “If the concept of the Other-as-object is to have any meaning, this can be only as the result of the conversion and the degradation of that original relation” (Sartre 1956: 345). How are we to understand this *Hegelian* claim: being-seen-by-the-Other is the *truth* of seeing-the-Other?

It first and foremost means that my own self-objectification is a derivative form of my more originary being-as-object. Having been seen by the Other, I am now not merely consciousness, but also a self; not merely a being which “is what it is not and which is not what it is,” i.e. absolute nothingness, but rather a self as an object of consciousness. I am for myself only in virtue of the reference to the Other. Having been seen by the Other, I am capable of making myself into my own object. Due to the intrusion of the Other which brought me out of nothingness into being, I have become a self-conscious self.

Let me turn back to where Ricoeur had left us: How can I, this flesh, see myself as a body? Now we are in the position to answer this question. On the one hand, I must be both body and flesh if I am to be self-conscious. On the other hand, my being as a body is possible only because my very flesh had been subject to the gaze of another. Only because my very being for the world is also a being in the world can I be a self-conscious being. Hence the very existence of self-consciousness is dependent upon the existence of the Other. The very fact that my body is both *Leib* and *Körper* leads to a Hegelian conclusion: each one is both the middle term, through which the Other relates to himself, and each is a being-for-oneself, which is such only

⁴ See *Oneself as Another*, 332–333.

due to this mediation. I can be both body and flesh only if the Other pierces through the heart of my being.

Conclusion

So as to bring this analysis to completion, a few words need to be said about the Husserlian critique of the Hegelian standpoint. When we are dealing with the Other and myself as the mediating term and an immediate being, are we not facing two fundamentally different kinds of beings? It becomes plain once the Hegelian insight is seen in terms of *Leib* and *Körper* that no transition from the Other and the I to the We is possible, since to be a body is precisely not to be flesh. Just as my for-itself cannot be known by the Other, so the Other's for-itself cannot be known by me. Since there is no common measure between being an object and being a subject, the transition from the "I" and the "Other" to the "We" is hardly likely. It is by far not clear how Hegel can overcome this form of "unhappy consciousness" which is manifest in the duality of being both flesh and body, being both for the world and in the world, in the described transition from self-consciousness to Reason, and, ultimately, to Spirit.

Having accounted for the transition from Self-consciousness to Reason as the certainty of consciousness that it is all reality, Hegel turns to the theme of *forgetfulness*. "The consciousness which is this truth has this path behind it and has forgotten it.... It merely *asserts* that it is all reality, but does not itself comprehend this; for it is along that forgotten path that this immediately expressed assertion is comprehended (PhS 1977: 141). From a Husserlian perspective, the emergence of forgetfulness at this particular point is a mark of genuine intellectual integrity. Yet the reason for this forgetfulness escapes Hegel's grasp. The path that is trodden is forgotten not because of certain limitations which pertain to Reason at its initial form, but rather because the transition itself is question-

able from the perspective of the relation of self-consciousness to otherness. At least such would be the Husserlian view. This is so, because I can never, in full philosophical responsibility, speak in the name of a totality and not a plurality. A Husserl might have learned the lesson from a Hegel that starting from my ownness, I discover the Other as an existence which conditions my very interiority. Yet this does not amount to an acknowledgment that the Other can no longer be questioned from the perspective of my own rudimentary forms of existence. In fact, it is only from this perspective that the question of the primitive forms of the manifestation of the Other can be broached. Even though my own body can be both *Leib* and *Körper* because it has come under the Other's gaze, I remain certain of the Other as a middle term and as an immediate existence only if I retain this paradox that lies at the heart of my own bodily existence. Yet Hegel effects a complete abstraction from the standpoint of the *cogito* and instead of inquiring into the relation between the I and the Other, studies the relation between consciousnesses of others. Only because of this methodological abstraction can he speak of truth being the Whole.

I leave the last word to Sartre: "No logical or epistemological optimism can cover the scandal of the plurality of consciousness.... So long as consciousnesses exist, the separation and conflict of consciousnesses will remain; we shall simply have discovered their foundation and their true terrain" (Sartre 1956: 329).

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SAVIMONĖ IR KITONIŠKUMAS: HEGELIS IR HUSSERLIS

Saulius Geniušas

Nepaisant begalinių skirtumų tarp Hegelio ir Husserlio, bendras elementas sieja jų abiejų aprašomą kitoniškumo genezę. Pasak abiejų, tik pasinėrus į savimonės gelmes galima identifikuoti elementariausią Kito pasireiškimą. Remiantis hegeliškais ir huserliškais šios strategijos variantais, šiame straipsnyje siekiama parodyti, kad: 1) elementariais savimonės lygiais subjektyvumas yra absoliučiai intersubjektyvus; 2) pliurališkumo negali nurungti totališkumas, nes neįveikiamas atstumas skiria Kitą nuo manęs. Bet ar šie teiginiai nėra vienas su kitu nesuderinami? Priešingai tokiai pozicijai, šiame straipsnyje parodoma, kaip kiekvienas iš šių teiginių šaukiasi savo tariamos priešybės. Nors šių teiginių vientisumas dažnai remiasi argumentais, nukreiptais prieš Hegelį, Husserlį arba juos abu, straipsnyje parodoma, kaip Hegelio ir Husserlio konfliktas yra šių teiginių harmonijos priežastis.

Reikšminiai žodžiai: kūnas, intersubjektyvumas, kitoniškumas, savimonė, troškimas.

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